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ARTICLES
THE USE (OR ABUSE) OF EXPERT WITNESSES IN
POST-DA UBERT EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION
Bruce D. Black*

I. DAUBERT'S FOUNDATION AND IMPACT ON EXPERT TESTIMONY
In the course of one decade, the United States Supreme Court has
come from holding that expert testimony as to future events was admissible to support a criminal conviction, to the point where it now requires
the district judge to carefully scrutinize proposed testimony before
permitting an expert to take the witness stand in a civil case.' It is instructive to chart the course of this shift in the paradigm for judging the
admissibility and use of expert opinions before considering the application of the current standard to the employment arena.

* Bruce D. Black is a United States District Court Judge for the District of New Mexico.
The genesis of this article was a lecture at the 17th Annual Multi-State Labor and Employment
Law Seminar sponsored by the Southern Methodist University School of Law in June 1999 in
Palm Springs, California.
1. For a thoughtful analysis of this trend, see Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to
Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753 (1998).
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In Barefoot v. Estelle,2 the Justices of the Supreme Court considered the use of psychiatric testimony to establish whether a criminal defendant had the propensity to be a future menace The Court found such
testimony admissible over due process objections.4 The result is even
more startling considering the amicus brief filed by the American Psychiatric Association, 5 which argued that such testimony was wholly unreliable.6 Rather than protecting the jury from hearing such "unreliable"
testimony, however, the Court resorted to the traditional legal analysis
premised on Wigmore's assertion that cross-examination "is beyond any
doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."'
The 1983 Supreme Court concluded, "[w]e are unconvinced.., at least
as of now, that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the
reliable from the unreliable evidence ....
Obviously, the Court's phrase, "at least as of now," had substantially more significance than was generally recognized. As it is now
known, just ten years later, the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.9 Rather than relying on
cross-examination to ferret out scientific fallacy,'0 the Daubert Court
declared that under the Federal Rules of Evidence it is "the trial judge
[who] must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."" In transferring this responsibility to the trial judge, the Supreme Court set out four general areas
requiring scrutiny before expert technique or theory could be presented
at trial: (1) whether it can be tested; 2 (2) whether it has been subjected
to peer review; 3 (3) its known or potential rate of error; 4 and (4) its
2. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
3. See id. at 896, 901-03.
4. See id. at 904-05; see also Gottesman, supra note 1, at 754 (discussing the Court's finding that the admission of the expert testimony "was not a deprivation of due process").
5. Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080).
6. See Gottesman, supra note 1, at 754.
7.

5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE

IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367, at 29 (3d ed. 1940).
8. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901 (emphasis added).
9. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
10. The Court appeared to recognize, however, that cross-examination retained its place as
one of the traditional means of "attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Id. at 596.
11. Id. at 589.
12. See id. at 593.
13. It must be noted that partially in response to Daubert,a host of "forensic" journals have
proliferated expressly to provide requisite "peer review" of expert witness theories by others who
also earn their living on the witness stand. See Lars Noah, Sanctifying Scientific Peer Review:
Publicationas a Proxyfor RegulatoryDecisionmaking, 59 U. Prrr. L. REV. 677, 677-78, 699-700
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general acceptance in the relevant professional community. 5 The
Daubert majority recognized that the trial judge has an increased responsibility, and the jury a more limited role, in evaluating the reliability of expert testimony.
We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no
matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from
learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is
the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the
exhaustive search for cosmic
understanding but for the particularized
16
resolution of legal disputes.
Daubertraises a host of questions for both the trial lawyer and the
trial judge. 7 Indeed, the dissenters in Daubert recognized that the majority opinion was ambiguous enough to raise several issues which have
since become the basis of the myriad of solutions used by district courts
grappling with how to apply the Daubert criteria to kaleidoscopic fact
patterns. 8 Commentators have also been quick to articulate the problems raised by the demise of the mechanical test widely adopted from
Frye v. United States. 9 Some of the questions emanating from Daubert
are summarized by Professors Wright and Gold:

(1998) (discussing how Daubert suggested that publication in a peer-reviewed journal should be
considered, among many factors, when determining the admissibility of an expert witness); see
also Samuel A. Day, Use of Forensic Economists in Commercial Litigation:A Defense Perspective, 66 DEF. COuNS. J. 552, 552 (1999) (discussing specific associations dealing with forensic
economics and the publication of the Journal of Forensic Economics by one such association);
Thomas R. Ireland, The Interface Between Law and Economics and ForensicEconomics, J. LEGAL
ECON., Spring/Summer 1997, at 60, 61 (discussing the novelty of the field of forensic economics
and its valid agenda within the realm of law and economics). This phenomena discounts the goal
of peer review as a check on reliability. See generally Effie J. Chan, Note, The "Brave New
World" of Daubert: True Peer Review, Editorial PeerReview, and Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 100, 100 (1995) (arguing that "true peer review also should take a central place" in postDaubertlitigation).
14. See Daubert,509 U.S. at 594.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 597.
17. See 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICrOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND
PROCEDURE § 6266, at 277 (1997).
18. See Daubert,509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"Questions arise simply from reading this part of the Court's opinion, and countless more questions will surely arise when hundreds of district judges try to apply its teaching to particular offers
of expert testimony." Id.
19. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also Chan, supra note 13, at 110-11 (explaining that
scientific validity is really an inquiry into process).
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Among the questions left to the lower courts to resolve are the following. What error rate is acceptable? What degree of acceptance is
required? Is general acceptance sufficient indicia of scientific validity
without other supporting criteria? What is general acceptance? Is the
manner of testing, not just testing itself, pertinent? Is just the fact of
publication and peer review the only issue or are the results or those
processes also important? What factors other than those listed in
Daubert are indicative of scientific validity? How should a trial court
weigh the various indicators of scientific validity? How deeply should
the trial court look into the factors pertinent to scientific validity? What
should the trial judge do when the Daubert criteria are not adaptable to
the case or are otherwise unreliable? 20

Professor Graham sets forth similar concerns regarding the application of Daubert.
How is the trial judge to decide the four listed factors individually and
weigh each in relation to the others? Is the absence of one or more
factors conclusive? When is the known or potential error rate too high
if explained to the trier of fact? What is "widespread" acceptance? In
short, when has the reasoning or methodology been shown to be reliable-valid enough to pass Rule 104(a)2 screening? What is the role of
Rule 403 in determining admissibility? 1

While many of these questions remain unanswered, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have made clear that the district court must
evaluate each case individually and be given wide latitude in its gatekeeping function.2 Indeed, since Daubert, the Supreme Court has twice
rejected attempts by appellate courts to subject district court decisions to
a more stringent review than the abuse of discretion standard normally
employed on admissibility of evidence issues.2 Particularly interesting
in these two subsequent opinions is Justice Breyer's acknowledgment
that while Daubert was designed to broaden the spectrum of inquiry
available to the district court when contemplating the admissibility of

20. WRIGHT & GOLD, supranote 17, § 6266, at 277-80 (footnotes omitted).
21. 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.5, at 82-83 (4th ed.
1996) (footnotes omitted).
22. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997) (preliminary print) (holding
that abuse of discretion is the proper standard to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence).
23. See id. at 141-42; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)
(preliminary print) (reaffirming the use of the abuse of discretion standard to review district court
decisions to admit or exclude expert testimony).
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expert testimony, the Daubert criteria could also be used to eliminate
"junk science."24
How has Daubert changed the standards for admissibility of expert
testimony and what, if anything, should practitioners do to respond to
Daubert?Whether Dauberthas created a sea of change, or merely some
surface choppiness, there can be little doubt it has lead to heightened
judicial vigilance. The underlying goal of Daubert is the recognition
that experts whose only goal is to prove a case in court are highly suspect and a jury should be shielded from such alchemists. The goal of
both Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702 and its Daubertderivative is
to exclude testimony in the courtroom which was created out of whole
cloth for no other purpose than to support a legal position." Justice
Breyer summarized the essence of the standard succinctly in Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael:27
The objective of that requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether
basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience,
employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.2
Thus, the litmus test questions what experts actually do in the relevant field. 29 If the methodology advanced by the expert has no useful
24. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 227-28
(1991) (explaining the concept of junk science). The elimination of "junk science" from the courtroom has echoed through the federal courts. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233,
1238 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The elimination of formal barriers to expert testimony has merely shifted to
the trial judge the responsibility for keeping 'junk science' out of the courtroom."). In his concurring opinion in Joiner,Justice Breyer stated:
[M]odem life, including good health as well as economic well-being, depends upon the
use of artificial or manufactured substances, such as chemicals. And it may, therefore,
prove particularly important to see that judges fulfill their Daubert gatekeeping function, so that they help assure that the powerful engine of tort liability, which can generate strong financial incentives to reduce, or to eliminate, production, points toward the
right substances and does not destroy the wrong ones.
Joiner,522 U.S. at 148-49.
25. FED. R. Evil. 702. This rule provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
26. See Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 126 F.3d 679, 687 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993)).
27. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
28. Id. at 152.
29. See Karlin v. Foust, 975 F. Supp. 1177, 1215 (W.D. Wis. 1997) ("The methods an expert
employs to reach his opinion must be at least as precise as the methods his profession would re-
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purpose, and cannot be verified in the real world outside of the court-

room," it is much less likely to be admissible.3 Therefore, anyone who
describes himself as a "forensic" anything may cause judicial antennae

to twitch.32

II. DAUBERT'S IMPACT ON THE PRACTICE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW

What is the significance of this development for labor and employment law? As in many other areas, the cases seem to fall into three
broad groups. Clearly, at one end of the spectrum there are subjects with
an aura of hard science, such as statistics, where both credentials and
methodology are relatively easy to verify.3 It is only when a statistician
lacks any relevant credentials or experience, or adopts a methodology

quire for out-of-court research.").
30. On remand, the Ninth Circuit recognized this proposition as a central holding of
Daubert, noting that if the only place an expert's research was published was legal reporters, "[flt's
as if there were a tacit understanding within the scientific community that what's going on here is
not science at all, but litigation." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th
Cir. 1995); see also Black v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 592, 603-04 (S.D. W. Va. 1998)
("The depth and breadth of litigation taint is so substantial the very validity of the study is compromised."); cf. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 740 F. Supp. 921, 924 (D.P.R. 1990) ("The
fact that a person spends substantially all of her time consulting with attorneys and testifying in
trials is not a disqualification, but it is not an automatic qualification guaranteeing admission of
expert testimony.").
31. See 2 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1239 (7th
ed. 1998) ("If the methodology is good enough for the real world, it is good enough for a trial. On
the other hand, if the methodology is altered for purposes of litigation, there is every reason to exclude it after Daubert.").
32. See Huey v. United Parcel Serv., 165 F.3d 1084, 1087 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming refusal
to permit "forensic vocational expert" to testify where an employee was discharged in retaliation
for filing a racial discrimination claim).
33. See generally Finch v. Hercules Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1395, 1415 (D. Del. 1996) ("Courts
have traditionally allowed litigants to present statistical evidence in employment discrimination
actions."); Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1217 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing the permissible use of statistical evidence in proving discriminatory animus); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
958 F.2d 1176, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1992) (allowing statistics of work life estimates in calculating
damages); Washington v. Vogel, 880 F. Supp. 1545, 1548 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (interpreting Daubert
to apply to the use of statistical evidence to prove employment discrimination and pretext); Dunn
v. Hercules, Inc., No. CIV.A.93-4175, 1995 WL 66828, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 1995) (holding
statistical evidence admissible to establish age discrimination); Flavel v. Svedala Indus., Inc., 875
F. Supp. 550, 557 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (finding statistical evidence used by expert admissible in an
age discrimination claim). Expert testimony regarding statistical evidence, however, must be relevant to prove the alleged discrimination. See Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 65 (2d Cir. 1997)
(finding expert testimony irrelevant and therefore inadmissible); Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am., 924 F. Supp. 331 (D. Mass.) (finding statistical evidence not relevant in establishing a prima facie case of gender discrimination), afd, 101 F.3d 218 (Ist Cir. 1996).
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completely foreign to that employed in the real world, that courts are
likely to reject such testimony.' Similarly, a certified public accountant
("CPA") can testify that a sales manager actually did generate profit,
since this is an accounting function employed by real world businesses.35
Another area where courts can generally evaluate credentials and
methodology is medical testimony.36 However, on issues like causation,
which are uniquely forensic, the decisions are very fact specific. 37 This
34. The methodology used by an expert witness to calculate statistics in an employment discrimination case was rejected by the Fifth Circuit. See Munoz v. Orr,200 F.3d 291, 301-02 (5th
Cir. 2000) (finding the statistician premised his analysis' on the assumption that employer's promotion system discriminated against Hispanic males and admitted he failed to consider other variables such as education and experience); see also Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co.,
175 F.R.D. 46, 48-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that testimony failed to show statistically significant racial disparities in discipline and promotion), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir.
1999); Smith v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 677 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(deciding methodology of regression analysis could not sustain a decision granting summary
judgment in Title VII cases). Problems regarding the admittance of statistics also arise when experts adopt a methodology completely foreign to that employed in the real world. Several cases
illustrate this proposition where evidence was rejected because statisticians failed to be as careful
as they would have been in their regular work. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104
F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that a magazine editor failed to analyze all relevant variables in his statistical analysis, which an expert would have done outside the context of litigation);
Raskin, 125 F.3d at 67 (excluding statistician's testimony in ADEA case where retirement age was
artificially inflated and population at large was not adequately considered); Kitchen v. TTX Co.,
No. 97C5271, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9975, at *4-7 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1999) (finding that the
study failed to eliminate or control non-discriminatory factors); Garrett v. Kenmore Mercy Hosp.,
No. 96-CV-0472E(M), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2132, at *24 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1998) (finding
statistics unreliable based on failure to consider different decision-makers and subpopulations).
35. See Walton v. Bisco Indus., 119 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1997).
36. See Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 126 F.3d 679, 694-97, 701 (5th Cir. 1997) (analyzing
the credentials and methodology of medical experts).
37. Compare id. at 707 (finding error to exclude clinical physician's opinion that truck
driver contracted reactive ainvay disease as a result of exposure to gases at workplace), and Hines
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 262, 276 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding it was error to exclude
opinion of plaintiff's expert that exposure to chemicals caused FELA injury), with Arnold v. Dow
Chem. Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 584, 589-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (permitting expert testimony to show
aerospace employee developed multiple myloma as a result of exposure to TCE), and Schudel v.
General Elec. Co., 120 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1997) (failing to show that the extrapolation of
studies of long-term exposure to cleaning solvents to low dose, short-term exposure to cleaning
solvents was scientifically acceptable). See also Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th
Cir. 1996) (finding physician's opinion on causation of disease not scientifically reliable); Whiting
v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 25 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding physicians were not qualified
to testify on health physics or radiation epidemiology); Exparte Diversey Corp., 742 So. 2d 1250,
1254-55 (Ala. 1999) (holding that physician's testimony that injury was probably caused by exposure to all chemicals was not sufficient to implicate defendant which only manufactured some of
them). The courts also have had some difficulty in applying Daubert principles to testimony given
by experts to the causation of psychological damage relating to discrimination in the workplace.
See, e.g., Page v. City of Chicago, 701 N.E.2d 218, 229 (111.App. Ct. 1998) (finding plaintiff suffered from post-traumatic stress resulting from harassment); Borg-Warner Protective Servs. v. Flores, 955 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tex. App. 1997) (affirming that rape trauma syndrome was caused
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is also true in the area of vocational rehabilitation." When medical testimony is the foundation for avant-garde and controversial conclusions,
however, Daubert has strengthened the ability of the trial judge to exclude such testimony.
At the other end of the spectrum is the testimony from experts

whose sole function is to create a scientific veneer for a legal theory.
Most obvious, and arguably not even touched by Daubert, are experts
who testify as to legal standards.40 Even prior to the adoption of Rule
702, federal judges were loathe to permit expert testimony on the intent
or application of federal statutes. Daubert has clearly done nothing to

assuage judicial hostility to such testimony in the employment area.4
The lack of any real-world crucible is also the essence of the problem with hedonic damages. To support hedonic damages in McGuire v.
City of Santa Fe,"2 the plaintiff advanced a Ph.D. psychologist who prepared "The Lost Pleasure of Life Scale." '3 This "scale" numerically
measured the plaintiff's diminished capacity to enjoy various areas of
his life. 44 A Ph.D. economist then assigned dollar values to each area.45
by harassment).
38. See Broussard v. University of Cal., at Berkeley, 192 F.3d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding that a vocational rehabilitation specialist's opinion was not reliable where he failed to
consider medical limitations and used only broad, non-specific job categories); Waldorf v. Shuta,
142 F.3d 601, 627 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding no error to permit developmental disabilities counselor
to testify based on practical experience even though he had no academic training in vocational
rehabilitation); Martin v. Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space, 7 Am. Disabilities. Cas. (BNA)
1861, 1865 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (rejecting rehabilitation expert's opinion which did not consider
statutorily relevant criteria).
39. One such area that seems to arise in various employment contexts is expert testimony on
the causes and effects of multiple chemical sensitivities. Courts remain skeptical of testimony in
this area. See Coffey v. County of Hennepin, 23 F. Supp.2d 1081, 1087 (D. Minn. 1998)
(excluding expert testimony regarding multiple chemical sensitivity); Coffin v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 20 F. Supp.2d 107, 111 (D. Me. 1998) (refusing to allow expert to testify about plaintiff's
multiple chemical sensitivity because such evidence is speculative and unreliable). But see Patrick
v. Southern Co. Servs., 910 F. Supp. 566, 570 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (deciding not to reach the issue of
plaintiff's alleged multiple chemical sensitivity under an Americans with Disabilities Act claim).
40. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 112 F.3d 1207, 1213 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in permitting an expert to define
either employer's duties or employee's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
41. See Huey v. United Parcel Serv., 165 F.3d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1999) (refusing to permit
an expert to testify "that Mr. Huey was the victim of retaliatory discharge by UPS for racially motivated reasons in violation of Title VII"); Nieves-Villanueva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92, 99 (1st
Cir. 1997) (finding it was error to permit expert to testify in action alleging defendants had
wrongly failed to renew plaintiffs' employment for political reasons); Perkins v. General Motors
Corp., 129 F.R.D. 655, 668 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (precluding expert testimony on the law of sexual
harassment in a pre-Daubertdecision), affd, 965 F.2d 597 (8th Cir. 1992).
42. 954 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.M. 1996).
43. Id.at231.
44. See id.
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While the theory allowed the plaintiff to place concrete numbers before
the fact finder, its scientific utility outside the courtroom was doubtful.46
Daubertalso dictates that expert testimony is only admissible if it
is both scientific and useful to the jury's understanding of fact issues.47
Expert testimony has thus been excluded in several harassment cases on
the basis that it would not be helpful to the fact finder.4' For example,
testimony by an industrial psychologist that the employer's decision to
terminate rather than transfer an older employee was "potentially influenced by a heightened level of age consciousness 49 would not expand

what jurors would know intuitively. 0
Cases at both ends of the spectrum, then, present relatively easy
Daubert issues. The problem with employment law is that much of the
expert testimony introduced is likely to fall in the middle ground where
the expert is enrolled in a legitimate discipline, such as psychology, and
employs the questioned methodology in his or her outside practice, but
has adapted such techniques to explain a phenomenon which requires
analysis only in, or because of, the law.5' Forensic medicine, for exam45. See id.
46. See id. at 233; see also Hein v. Merck & Co., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 230, 235 (M.D. Tenn.
1994) (finding expert testimony on hedonie damages unreliable under Daubert);Sullivan v. United
States Gypsum Co., 862 F. Supp. 317, 320-21 (D. Kan. 1994) (same). But see Kumcz v. Honda N.
Am., Inc., 166 F.R.D. 386, 391 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (finding hedonic damages available in personal
injury case, but "willingness to pay model" not reliable).
47. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,592 (1993).
48. See Curtis v. Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200, 1219 (10th Cir.
1998) (limiting expert testimony regarding the effectiveness of recruitment plan and whether there
was evidence of retaliation); Sherbert v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 66 F.3d 965, 967 (8th Cir. 1995)
(finding expert testimony regarding the operation of a forklift within the common knowledge of
the jury); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 930 F. Supp. 134, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding testimony
regarding the plaintiffs emotional state unnecessary and not helpful to the fact finder); McCoy v.
Macon Water Auth., No. 5:94-CV-480-4(HL), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21723, at *3 (M.D. Ga.
Nov. 21, 1996) (excluding expert testimony in a sexual harassment action because it would not be
helpful to the jury); Fowler v. Kootenai County, 918 P.2d 1185, 1191 (Idaho 1996) (finding expert
testimony regarding hostile work environment claim unnecessary to assist the jury).
49. Camp v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. CIV.A.H-97-1938, 1998 WL 966002, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 29, 1998). But see Finch v. Hercules Inc., 941 F. Supp. 1395, 1417 (D. Del. 1996)
(holding that even though the average juror has some knowledge of average retirement age, expert
testimony would better inform jurors).
50. See Camp, 1998 WI 966002, at *3.
51. Compare Skidmore v. Precision Printing and Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 618 (5th
Cir. 1999) (admitting psychologist's testimony on question of intentional infliction of emotional
distress arising from alleged harassment in the workplace), with Olsen v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 75 F.
Supp.2d 1052, 1057-58 (D. Ariz. 1999) (finding testimony of psychologist on role of massage in
triggering memory of sexual abuse not admissible in case alleging hotel discriminated against male
massage therapist), and Camp, 1998 WL 966002, at *3 (refusing to allow an industrial psychologist to testify to various aspects of employer's decision to terminate rather than transfer employee,
which was allegedly made on the basis of age bias).
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ple, is often concerned with the cause of death of an individual, whether
or not a personal representative brings suit. 2 On the other hand, whether
or not a victim of sexual harassment can explain her failure to timely

file a charge based on a psychological profile of typical victims is a
question exclusive to the legal process. 3
The most frequently recurring question in this gray third area is

whether a psychologist should be permitted to testify on his analysis of
the employer's policies and practices.' In several such cases, courts
have permitted a plaintiff to introduce expert testimony that the defendant's harassment policy was not meaningful or was functionally nonexistent.5 Since Daubert, however, some courts have required a more
thorough analysis. 6
The difficulty courts have in applying Daubert to such psychological testimony in harassment cases becomes clear by comparing two
cases that involved the same expert who testified on similar issues. In
McCoy v. Macon Water Authority,57 Dr. Jan Salisbury was offered to
testify on a same-sex harassment claim as to the adequacy of the employer's harassment policies and the appropriateness of the employer's
response to the plaintiffs complaints. s In excluding such testimony, the
district court focused on the role and knowledge of both the jury and
the judge.

52. See generally Henry C. Lee, Forensic Science and the Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1117,
1117, 1123 (1993) (discussing forensic medicine and its concern with the cause of death
of individuals).
53. For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see John V. Jansonius & Andrew M.
Gould, Expert Witnesses in Employment Litigation: The Role of Reliability in Assessing Adinissibility, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 325-31 (1998) (discussing the criteria for scrutinizing reliability of
expert witnesses in employment cases); Lewis R. Hagood, Claims of Mental and Emotional Dam.
ages in Employment DiscriminationCases, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 577, 596-99 (1999) (discussing
the use of psychiatric testimony in employment cases).
54. See Janice Goodman, Use of Expert Witnesses in Sexual Harassment Cases, 606 PLI/LIT
391 (1999).
55. See Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 P.2d 999, 1008 (N.M. 1999) (admitting expert
testimony regarding defendant's harassment policy); Harper v. Southeast Ala. Med. Ctr., 998 F.
Supp. 1289, 1297 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (finding expert testimony regarding inadequacy of sexual harassment policy admissible). For a further discussion of these cases, see Goodman, supra note 54,
at 391.
56. See Hilt v. SFC, Inc., 170 F.R.D. 182, 185 (D. Kan. 1997) (ordering a supplemental report where the expert's report did not adequately set forth supporting rationale); Ferriso v. Conway
Org., 67 EmpI. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 43,770, at 83,838 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1995) (suggesting
amended report would allow expert to testify).
57. No. 5:94-CV-480-4(HL), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21723 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 21, 1996).
58. See id. at *3.
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[Ms. Salisbury's] expertise in the area of sexual harassment would not
be not [sic] helpful to a jury and seems likely to confuse rather than
clarify the issues in the case. A jury does not need an expert to explain
that the tone of a particular meeting was "disrespectful, demeaning,
intimidating, patronizing, discounting, and argumentative." The jury
can evaluate the tone of the meeting itself after listening to the tape,
and may also consider whether the Plaintiff himself contributed to that
tone. Furthermore, the jury will not benefit from an expert's opinion
that "management's lack of understanding of their legal and moral responsibilities and psychological aspects of the harassing behaviors
probably resulted in a continuation of harassing behaviors and behaviors easily perceived as retaliation." It is the duty of the Court, not of
an expert witness, to define management's legal responsibilities, and
then the province of the jury to determine whether management understood those responsibilities and fulfilled them. Because Ms. Salisbury's report fails to set forth any admissible evidence, the Court will
not consider it in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.59
6°
The next year, in Blakey v. ContinentalAirlines, Inc., Dr. Salisbury's opinion was offered in a sexual harassment claim as to what an
employer can do to prevent and to address sexual harassment. The district judge spelled out Dr. Salisbury's credentials in detail and noted Dr.
Salisbury's testimony had been permitted in some state and federal
courts and barred in others.6' The court noted, however, that when Dr.
Salisbury's testimony was rejected, it was not "because she was not
qualified but because her testimony was too 'abstract' and would not be
helpful to the jury."6 The district court concluded that such testimony
could be helpful to the jury so long as it was limited to employment
practices and did not contain legal conclusions.

Expert testimony on the issues of what an employer can do to prevent and address complaints of sexual harassment in the workplace
could assist the jury in determining whether Continental had an effective program to prevent and remedy sexual harassment. The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that jurors of common knowledge and
experience are not familiar with the complex issues involved in determining the efficacy of an employer's policies and procedures to
prevent sexual harassment and acknowledged the value of expert testimony.... Some Title VII cases have recognized the value of expert
59. Id. at *3-4 (citations omitted).
60. No. 93-2194(WvGB), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22074 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 1997).

61. See id. at *7-9.
62. Id. at *9.
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testimony on the issue of employment practices, though most of these
trial[s] brought to the Court's attention by the parties have been bench
trials. Other courts have not allowed testimony by an expert on typical
reactions of victims of sexual harassment.
The Court will allow Ms. Salisbury to testify, but not as to everything in her report, much of which contains legal conclusions and invades the province of the jury. Her testimony will be limited to the
general policies and practices a company may undertake in an effort to
be effective in preventing and addressing allegations of sexual harassment. 63
Another interesting fact pattern which demonstrates the difficulty
of employing a "soft science-like" psychology to employment disputes
is presented in Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Department.4 In
that case a captain in the Los Angeles fire department sued alleging that
the department's sexual harassment policy, which prohibited Playboy
magazine in the firehouse, violated the First Amendment. 5 The department defended its policy by introducing expert testimony that reading

such magazines would lead to sex stereotyping.6 In rejecting the city's
expert and this "hypothesis," the district judge noted:
Dr. Linz testified that, in his expert opinion, the reading of Playboy
leads to sex-role stereotyping and that sex-role stereotyping leads to
sexual harassment. However, his conclusions were based upon two
studies which are inconclusive and are based on factual scenarios posing little resemblance to the present case.67
The court then relied on the testimony of the plaintiff's expert to
point out the scientific flaws in the studies advanced by defendant's expert.
According to Dr. Malamuth, the McKenzie and Imrich studies have no
probative value in determining the impact that Playboy has on male

63. Id. at *9-11 (citations omitted).
64. 865 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1994).

65. See id. at 1434.
66. See id. at 1441. One commentator has suggested that both the subject on which expert
testimony is admitted and the decision to admit or reject such testimony in sexual harassment cases
is itself the result of sexual stereotyping. See Donna Shestowsky, Note, Where is the Common
Knowledge? EmpiricalSupportfor Requiring Expert Testimony in Sexual Harassment Trials, 51
STAN. L. REV. 357,364-66 (1999).
67. Johnson, 865 F. Supp. at 1441.
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fire fighters. To begin with, the studies involved films which included
explicit intercourse. Playboy merely contains photographs of nude
women; it contains no explicit depictions of intercourse. Secondly, the
studies were based on college-age males. Most male fire fighters are
older. Third, the studies utilized a scientifically inadequate number of
subjects and used questionable control groups. Finally, Dr. Malamuth
pointed out that the two studies offered inconclusive and ambiguous
conclusions and that some of these conclusions actually support a
finding that the reading of Playboy has no impact on a male fire
fighter's treatment of his female coworkers. For example, the Imrich
study found that pornographic films had no influence on the males'
rating of the female job applicant.
The claim that there is a connection between the reading of Playboy
and "sexual stereotyping" is, in Dr. Malamuth's opinion, a viable hypothesis. It is, however, nothing more than that-based upon the present state of scientific studies, the connection between Playboy and
"sexual stereotyping" is not a scientific probability, much less a scientific certainty. 3
After some early problems in determining the proper standard of
review, appellate courts now often affirm, occasionally even if the
Daubertanalysis could have been more clearly articulated in the lower
courts.69 In Bryant v. City of Chicago,70 for example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed and provided a detailed Daubert

analysis which was apparently lacking in the district court opinion.' In
that case, plaintiff challenged the lawyer psychologist, Dr. Barrett, who
created the police promotion exam which the plaintiff failed. The Seventh Circuit first put aside the plaintiffs claim that Dr. Barrett's testimony was unsubstantiated and unreliable under Daubert.72
A district court enjoys broad latitude both in deciding how to determine reliability and in making the ultimate reliability determination. It
is clear from the record that the district court recognized the applicability of Daubertto Dr. Barrett's testimony. Furthermore, while appel-

68. Id. at 1441-42.
69. In General Elec. Co. v. Joiner,522 U.S. 136 (1997), for example, the Supreme Court
held that the appellate courts should grant substantial deference to the trial judge's decision regarding the admissibility of expert testimony and reverse only for an abuse of discretion. See Joiner,52
U.S. at 143.
70. 200 F.3d 1092 (7th Cir. 2000).
71. See id. at 1097-98.
72. See id.
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lants broadly assert that the district judge failed to consider Daubertin
making his admissibility determination, their argument actually focuses on what they perceive to be the district court's improper application of the Daubertframework. 73
The Court of Appeals then applied the Daubertanalysis to Dr. Barrett's credentials and work product.
In the present case, it is clear that Dr. Barrett's testimony had "'a reliable basis in knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.'
Dr. Barrett has extensive academic and practical experience in designing employment evaluations. Furthermore, it is not accurate to claim
that the district judge declined to conduct an inquiry into the scientific
validity of Dr. Barrett's opinion. As the district court noted, Dr. Barrett
based his opinions, at least in part, on the job analysis that Barrett &
Associates meticulously formulated which detailed a relationship between the skills measured in the examination and an individual's effectiveness as a lieutenant. Furthermore, while plaintiffs contend that
the "general scientific literature" in the area consists of a single unpublished study, it is undisputed that Dr. Barrett himself has authored
approximately fifty articles dealing with employee selection and promotion testing for peer-reviewed journals. This is not a case in which
the expert failed to conduct any studies or analysis to substantiate his
opinion. Given these facts, it is clear that the district judge's decision
to admit Dr. Barrett's testimony was not manifestly erroneous.14
Appellate courts, however, have continued to reverse lower court
decisions when they are convinced that the excluded expert testimony
was actually reliable. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co.7' is a case which
demonstrates how judges can differ in determining how Daubert should
be applied to expert testimony from recognized disciplines in harassment and discrimination claims. In that case, female employees brought

a class action alleging that a group of related companies engaged in sexual discrimination on promotions as well as sexual harassment.76 The
district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and referred the case to a
special master to consider damages.n The special master considered all

73.

Id. at 1098 (citations omitted).

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. (citations omitted).
130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997).

See id. at 1290.
See id.
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state and federal standards and made a report and recommendations to
the district court which adopted them.78
One of the issues before the Eighth Circuit in Jenson was the exclusion of psychiatric and psychological testimony as to the causation of
the plaintiffs' mental anguish.79 The Court of Appeals carefully recounted the impressive credentials of these medical experts, then quoted
from the special master's report.
The evidence establishes that, while working at Eveleth Mines and
previously, most of the claimants were subjected to outside stresses or
trauma, or suffered from emotional problems, which could have had
psychological impact and caused symptomatology. No one advanced a
validated theory which furnishes a scientific basis for distinguishing
between the causal effect of multiple psychological stresses or trauma,
or for assigning relative impact or degree of impact to different trauma
or stresses. This Court is persuaded by unanimous testimony of psychiatrists and psychologists, called by both sides, that there is no scientific method for determining the cause of a mental disorder or for
allocating proportionate cause when more than one possible
cause exists.8'
Reversing the exclusion of these opinions, the Eighth Circuit found
that by adopting the special master's report, the district court had abused
its discretion in refusing to recognize the reliability of such psychiatric
testimony. The Eighth Circuit went on to consider the Daubert standard and found it also was misapplied. 3
To the extent the Special Master relied upon Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., to support his rulings, we find his rulings
to be in error. In Daubert,the Supreme Court addressed the standards
of admissibility for specific evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence
702. There is some question as to whether the Daubert analysis should
be applied at all to "soft" sciences such as psychology, because there
are social sciences in which the research, theories and opinions cannot
have the exactness of hard science methodologies. However, the question of whether Daubert should be applied to the psychological evidence excluded here does not affect our ruling in this case, because we
78. See id. at 1290-91.
79. See id. at 1291, 1295.
80. See Jenson, 130 F.3d at 1295, 1297.

81. Id. at 1297 (citation omitted).
82. See id.

83. See id. at 1297-98.
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find that under either Daubert or under the more general parameters of
Rule 702, the proffered testimony was both reliable and relevant, and
should have been admitted into evidence.8

1I. ETHICS: PRACTICAL TIPS FOR THE POST-DA UBERT WORLD
Once an expert has been retained, what steps are necessary to prepare for a successful Dauberthearing and eventually trial? This is where
one must be at his or her best as a counselor, as well as an advocate. 5

Attorneys must consider their duty to the court and to the profession, as
well as to their client. Fortunately, these interests usually coalesce. If
one attempts to overreach and create a prostitute who will parrot only
the party line, a disservice will be committed not only to the justice
system and the profession, but ultimately to one's client and himself.86
Judges and juries are good at detecting both insincerity and falsehood.
The practitioner is much better off having a learned and honest expert
with some points of vulnerability, than a phony expert whose story is
ironclad. In order to avoid going to trial with a phony expert, as well as

to be able to effectively cross-examine your opponent's expert, one will
need to become something of an expert. Read the literature and question

potential experts about troubling points. This will also allow practitio-

84. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
85. See Timothy J. Sullivan, The Legal Profession and Its Future:Recapturing the Ideal of
the Statesman-Lawyer, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 477 (1998). Dean Sullivan's requirements seem apropos to not only the practice in general, but especially in this context.
The first is the role of the lawyer as a learned person.... The point is that to be
learned means to be broadly and to be deeply educated-not just in techniques-but in
values; not just in the narrow knowledge of high specialization, but in the complex and
powerful forces that shape civilization and govern human conduct. To be a learned
lawyer is to be at home with art, to know history, to be moved by great literature. To be
a learned lawyer means to feel the truth in Holmes' suggestion that in law one hears an
"echo of the infinite.... a hint of the universal."
Id. at 478-79 (footnotes omitted).
86. See MERrrr BENNErr, LAW AND THE HEART (The Message Co. 1997). Santa Fe attorney
Meritt Bennett discusses the lawyer's broader duties in his book by noting:
[L]awyers can also give voice to their feelings of what is right as well as what is
"legal." Many lawyers suppress their expression of what feels right for fear of offending
the fee-paying client who is looking for a quick legal "fix." As a result, the lawyer may
manipulate the law to yield legal solutions which do not feel right even though they can
always be impeccably rationalized.
Id. at 26.
87. See Aluminum Phosphate Antitrust Litig., Civ. 93-2452 (D. Kan. 1995) (characterizing
plaintiffs expert as an "expert for hire" who could only "speculate and surprise").
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ners to independently evaluate an expert's opinions and methods which,
under Daubert,one may need to defend well before trial.'
A skillful lawyer will also provide the expert with all the necessary
facts. Charles E. Wagner outlines some of the predicates that must be
considered in a scientific testing case:
1. The samples collected and examined are authentic and are what
they are purported to be, and the chain-of-custody, with respect
to the handling of the samples or material, is intact;
2. The witness was qualified to collect the samples to insure their
integrity and to avoid any adulteration of the material;
3. The witness is qualified to operate the instrument or machinery
and to attest to the instrument's reliability;
4. The instrument is reliable and was in good working order at the
time of the test in issue;
5. The person who conducted the experiment or test utilized proper
test procedures; and
6. The test yielded a particular result. 9
It is ethical and even advisable to broadly discuss the relevant legal
theories with a potential expert.' Nothing is more destructive to an expert's credibility than having to recognize on cross-examination that he
or she was not aware of a critical fact favorable to the other side.

88. while nothing in Daubert requires a hearing before any expert testimony can be admitted, courts now generally conduct such hearings. See City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc.,
158 F.3d 548, 564-65 n.21 (lth Cir. 1998) (holding that Daubert does not require a hearing, but
its "almost always fruitful"); United States v. Iron Cloud, 171 F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir. 1999)
(finding it error not to hold Daubert hearing if expertise or theory at issue). But see Holbrook v.
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 80 F.3d 777, 784 (3d Cir. 1996) (deciding that while "ordinarily"
Daubertcould be construed to require a hearing, abuse of discretion standard applies).
89. CHARLES E. WAGNER, FEDERAL RULEs OF EVIDENCE CASE LAW COMMENTARY 613-14

(1997-98 ed.).
90. See In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 502 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (C.D. Cal. 1980)
(discussing preparation of experts for depositions).
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However, it is equally obvious that there is a difference between
preparation and perjury. For example, a lawyer may not prepare or assist
in preparing false or misleading testimony that he or she knows or
should know is false or misleading." If one's expert testifies falsely, not

only is he or she open to perjury charges, but the client may be deprived
of a judgmentf It is equally clear that if an attorney knowingly participates in the presentation of false evidence, he or she may be disbarred,
sued civilly for legal malpractice, and criminally prosecuted.93
The ethical problems that seem to be most troublesome in the area
of employment disputes arise out of attorney contact with employees
and former employees, particularly if one wishes to inquire about
"expertise" acquired during employment. 94 While there is debate on
what level of contact is acceptable, it seems to be the general consensus
that opposing counsel is not completely prohibited from contacting former employees of his corporate opponent.95 However, counsel appointed
to sue the corporation on the plaintiff's behalf may feel ethically and
practically constrained when the former employee is receiving a corporate pension or has other financial ties to the defendant corporation. In a

few such fact situations corporate counsel have been successful in obtaining restraining orders to prevent plaintiff's opposing counsel from
contacting their ex-employees.96 However, corporate defense counsel
have had much greater success prohibiting contact with former employ91. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(A)(6) (2000).
92. In Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1385-86 (1 lth Cir. 1988), defendant had the punitive damage portion of an arbitration award vacated when it successfully proved
that plaintiff's expert had testified falsely regarding his education and employment. Cf Medina v.
Found. Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., 940 P.2d 1175, 1179 (N.M. 1997) (vacating arbitration award when
plaintiff himself was found to have testified falsely).
93. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.4(b) (2000) (providing a lawyer
shall not "falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely"); accord MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(A)(4) (2000) (prohibiting attorney from using or creating false or perjured evidence); see also Turner v. Anderson, 704 So. 2d 748, 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) (illustrating a legal malpractice claim). For further discussion, see Brian N. Smiley,
The Law and Ethics of Witness Preparation,1061 PLI/CORP 659 (1998).
94. See In re Petroleum Products,502 F. Supp. at 1099.
95. See Curley v. CumberlaAd Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 83 (D.N.J. 1991) (permitting informal contacts sought by plaintiffs); University Patents, Inc. v. Kligman, 737 F. Supp. 325, 328
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (allowing former employees to be contacted); Porter v. Arco Metals Co., 642 F.
Supp. 1116, 1118 (D. Mont. 1986) (permitting former employees to be contacted exparte provided
they have no significant managerial responsibilities). For further discussion, see Susan J. Becker,
Conducting Informal Discovery of a Party'sFormerEmployees: Legal and Ethical Concerns and
Constraints, 51 MD. L. REv. 239, 271-74 (1992) (discussing ethical constraints on counsel's
communications with a party's former employees).
96. See Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas. Ins. Servs., 745 F. Supp.
1037 (D.N.J. 1990).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol17/iss2/19

18

Black: The Use (or Abuse) of Expert Witnesses in Post-Daubert Employment
2000]

Expert Witnesses in Post-DaubertEmployment Litigation

ees where there is a legitimate factual basis to argue that such employees were privy to trade secrets or proprietary information.97 While corporate counsel may wish to insulate former employees from such contact with opposing counsel, they may also wish to avoid making such
former employees agents of the company. Whether, when, and to what
extent counsel may communicate with potential class members also

raises thorny ethical issues for both plaintiffs and defense counsel?5
IV. CONCLUSION

Daubert has, at the very least, increased district court judges'
awareness of their significant gatekeeping role in evaluating the reliability of expert testimony. "Forensic" experts, whose only role in litigation is to provide support for attorneys, are therefore going to come
under microscopic scrutiny. So are those experts who are not as careful
in their methodology in court as they would be in their practice outside
the courtroom. In response, practitioners should choose ethical experts
and spend sufficient time to prepare them well.

97. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, 873 F. Supp. 1037, 1048 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
(issuing an injunction where former employee was privy to confidential information), affd, 97
F.3d 1452 (6th Cir. 1996); American Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler, 575 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ohio
1991) (affirming the issuance of an injunction where confidential information is involved). But see
Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding insufficient
evidence to establish that contacts with former employees would reveal confidential information);
PPG Indus., Inc. v. BASF Corp., 134 F.R.D. 118, 123 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (recognizing former employee's knowledge of trade secrets could prohibit contact but finding no such knowledge therein).
For further discussion, see Brian Burke, Disqualifying an Opponent's Expert When the Expert is
Your Client'sFormerEmployee, 66 DEF. COUNs. J. 69 (1999).
98. See Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 186 F.R.D. 672, 678-79 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (discussing the
danger of coercion for justifying limitations placed on communications with class members);
Fulco v. Continental Cablevision, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 45, 47 (D. Mass. 1992) (discussing exparte
interviews of absent class members and its ethical implications).
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